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COMMENTS ON DANIEL SHAVIRO'S TAX REFORM
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISK OF A US. B UDGET
CATASTROPHE
David Gamage*
Being asked to comment on Daniel Shaviro's work is a true honor.
Reading Shaviro's many books and articles while I was in law school
played a major role in convincing me to attempt to follow in his footsteps
by pursuing my own career in tax law and policy. As usual, Shaviro's
analysis in his symposium essay is poignant and provocative.
Shaviro predicts that due to (1) demographic and social change, (2)
failures in U.S. political economy, and (3) problems with financial markets,
the U.S. is on "an unsustainable long-term fiscal path" that could "trigger
sufficient global macroeconomic disruption to make the 2008 financial
crisis look like a Sunday school picnic."' I generally agree with these
2
predictions.
After painting this frightening picture, Shaviro analyzes its implications
for U.S. tax reform. The central postulate underlying Shaviro's analysis is
that we should not create further budgetary harm. This postulate may seem
manifestly obvious. After all, if the current U.S. long-term fiscal path is
dangerously unsustainable, why should we do anything that would make it
worse? Even if we do not know how to fix the problem, in light of
Shaviro's political economy diagnosis, should we not at least follow the
physician's Hippocratic Oath to do no harm?
Nevertheless, despite the obvious attractiveness of this do-no-harm
principle, I am uncertain as to its usefulness as a guide for budget policy.
One might wonder to whom Shaviro's essay is addressed. Shaviro's
political economy diagnosis relies on noting that because "Republicans
unconditionally reject any tax increases whatsoever, and indeed repeatedly
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demand further huge tax cuts, the model that underlay multiple bipartisan
deals in the 1980s is effectively ruled out."3 Clearly then, Shaviro's essay is
not directed toward these Republicans. If it were, the advice would be
simple. If Republicans could be convinced to accept tax hikes as part of a
bipartisan compromise, then presumably we could resolve our fiscal
imbalances with a bipartisan deal of the sort that Shaviro says is effectively
ruled out due to the Republicans' intransigence.
Should we then assume that Shaviro's essay is targeted toward
Democrats? Although Democrats might be unable to solve our fiscal
imbalances without cooperation from Republicans, Democrats could
perhaps still veto policy changes that would worsen the long-term fiscal
picture. But would it really be wise for Democrats to adopt such a strategy?
We might reasonably expect majority control in Washington to alternate
between Democrats and Republicans in the coming decades, as it has in the
past. Democrats exercising fiscal restraint might primarily then serve to
grant Republicans more latitude for irresponsible tax cuts during periods in
which Republicans are in the majority.
Indeed, if we take the Republicans' "starve the beast" rhetoric
seriously, tax hikes today are intended to force spending cuts in the future.
The mechanism by which these future spending cuts will be forced upon the
political system is rarely discussed. But a likely candidate is the very fiscal
crisis that Shaviro wants to delay. Once we hit fiscal Armageddon, we will
need to make painful adjustments. Consciously or unconsciously,
Republicans may be working to set up dynamics to ensure that these painful
adjustments will result in a post-crisis path of lower taxes and spending-
thus favoring Republicans' political goals over those of Democrats.
I do not mean to suggest that Democrats should purposefully pursue
fiscal irresponsibility. But should Democrats really sacrifice other policy
goals in the pursuit of fiscal prudence, in light of Republicans' failure to do
so? If the best we can hope for is to delay our looming fiscal crisis, perhaps
Democrats should instead work to set up dynamics so that the post-crisis
environment will more closely match Democratic values. Or perhaps
Democrats should focus on more near-term policy goals without paying
much attention to our fiscal imbalances.
We might conceive of our fiscal politics as resembling a game of
chicken: Republicans and Democrats both want to further their fiscal goals
to the extent possible, at the expense of the other party's goals, but in the
absence of compromise, everyone will be made worse off by the eventual
crash. Adopting a complete unwillingness to compromise is probably not
Shaviro, supra note 1.
600 [Vol. 50:599
COMMENTS ON SHA VIRO'S "TAX REFORM IMPLICA TIONS"
the ideal strategy in this game, at least if one holds out the hope of avoiding
the crash. But neither is the ideal strategy to appear overly willing to
compromise. Within a game of chicken, appearing overly willing to
compromise can lead to the opposition taking an increasingly hard line.
Unless Democrats are willing to completely surrender to Republicans'
fiscal goals, it is not at all clear that Democrats should pursue a course of
fiscal prudence. It may be that our best course toward a disaster-preventing
compromise would be for Democrats to temporarily embrace fiscal
irresponsibility and thereby (hopefully) scare Republicans into coming back
to the negotiating table.
My comments here are purposefully speculative. I mean to raise
questions, not to answer them. Shaviro's essay offers sound advice if we
think the best way forward is prudence and fiscal moderation. My only
suggestion is that perhaps we need to think more deeply about how
compromise might be achieved in light of the political economy dynamics
that Shaviro explains underlie our looming problems. Determining solutions
to the political economy dysfunctions underlying our long-term fiscal
imbalances is a herculean task. But if we as a scholarly community do not
attempt this challenge, it is likely that no one will.
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